The Ashford Zone Blog

… but on the other hand, it means I don’t have to type as much.

Here’s Josh Marshall:

Some of the White House jabs against their critics these days are so fatuous and simple-minded that it’s hard not to step back every so often and wonder if they’re even serious.

One of the silliest goes like this. We invaded because Iraq was "a threat". And all the Democrats agree that Iraq was "a threat". And, heck, here’s this quote from Bill Clinton saying that Saddam was "a threat". So clearly everyone agreed with the president. So what’s the problem?

Perhaps it seems like I’m oversimplifying the argument. But I really must plead its inherently moronic nature.

Sure, lots of people thought Iraq was a threat. But North Korea is a very serious threat. And we haven’t invaded North Korea. And Iran’s no bed of roses either. But we haven’t invaded Iran, though I guess perhaps I shouldn’t speak too soon.

Right on.  But (after a while), he really echoes what has been in my head for ages:

Garden variety lying is knowing it’s Y and saying it’s X — Lyndon Johnson at the Gulf of Tonkin. This is a much deeper indifference to factual information in itself.

People ask me sometimes whether I think the president thought Saddam did have big stockpiles of WMD or whether he knew Saddam didn’t and lied about it. Or the same with Iraq’s alleged links to al Qaida. This even leads to a sort of inverted conspiracy theorizing when people ask, "If he knew there was no WMD, why didn’t they at least try to plant some to avoid the catastrophic embarrassment which ensued after the war."

The real answer, I think, is as banal as it is devastating: I don’t think they ever gave it much thought — not in the sense of trying to get to the heart of the matter. A lawyer assembles a case. Whether his client is innocent or not is sort of beside the point. He’s trying to get him acquitted. Very similar here. The point was to invade. Non-conventional weapons made it a real possibility. A connection to 9/11 would make it a slam dunk. Some of each might get you just past the goal line. And if that didn’t something else might.

This is why there was the bum’s rush for the inspections process. I’m sure they figured there were some chemical weapons to be found somewhere. But why take the chance that there weren’t, or more likely, why take the chance there wouldn’t be enough? That would defeat the whole purpose.

The emphasis is mine, and that’s the part I’m keen on. 

Bush didn’t approach this war as an impartial man.  He was an advocate for a position he had already taken.  As such, like a lawyer, he marshalled evidence which favored him and presented it as "the truth". 

This is not inherently BAD — after all, being a lawyer (and taking a position) is how I earn MY living.  But here’s the difference: I work within a system which permits some other lawyer to take a contrary position.  And the rules of evidence require us to exchange all our evidence — favorable and unfavorable — to the other side.  That way, everybody walks into court with the same hand.  And hopefully, with the two advocates taking contrary positions on the evidence, the TRUTH (which typically lies somewhere in the middle) will out.

The Bush Administration troubles me — not for the position they took — but for the disservice they engaged in by not revealing all the evidence.  They turned over intelligence to Congress and the American people, but only in a perversely skewed way which favors the decision the Administration had already made.  It didn’t have the adversarial protections that make our judicial system work.  So, of COURSE many elected officials and citizenry came down "in favor of" the Iraq invasion.  The deck was stacked that way from the get-go.   Intentionally.

Josh calls this a "toxic approach to governance".  That is it exactly.

And indeed, had there actually been WMDs in Iraq, or an actual Saddam-alQaeda link, the American people wouldn’t have felt bamboozled by the White House’s slight-of-hand (even though, technically, we were bamboozled anyway).  But the Bush Administration took that risk — or more probably, ignored the risk — that their prevarifications about Iraq’s threat would be confirmed.  It backfired.  And the only people who should suffer ramifications for that — politically speaking — are them, not the so-called "naysayers" and critics.

This escaped me, but I’m glad it came across my transom.

[UPDATE: But Juan Cole’s excellant piece didn’t — read it too.]

From August 3, 2005, William Odom (retired Army General, and the head of the National Security Agency in the Reagan Administration) deconstructs the arguments against pulling out of Iraq.  The piece is entitled "What’s Wrong With Cutting And Running?"

He starts off by listing all the reasons that are typically given for "staying the course" in Iraq:

Here are some of the arguments against pulling out:

1) We would leave behind a civil war.

2) We would lose credibility on the world stage.

3) It would embolden the insurgency and cripple the move toward democracy.

4) Iraq would become a haven for terrorists.

5) Iranian influence in Iraq would increase.

6) Unrest might spread in the region and/or draw in Iraq’s neighbors.

7) Shiite-Sunni clashes would worsen.

8) We haven’t fully trained the Iraqi military and police forces yet.

9) Talk of deadlines would undercut the morale of our troops.

He then takes them apart, one by one.  Here’s a smattering:

1) On civil war. Iraqis are already fighting Iraqis. Insurgents have killed far more Iraqis than Americans. That’s civil war. We created the civil war when we invaded; we can’t prevent a civil war by staying. 

For those who really worry about destabilizing the region, the sensible policy is not to stay the course in Iraq.

***

3) On the insurgency and democracy. There is no question the insurgents and other anti-American parties will take over the government once we leave. But that will happen no matter how long we stay. Any government capable of holding power in Iraq will be anti-American, because the Iraqi people are increasingly becoming anti-American.

***

4) On terrorists. Iraq is already a training ground for terrorists. In fact, the CIA has pointed out to the administration and congress that Iraq is spawning so many terrorists that they are returning home to many other countries to further practice their skills there.

***

9) On not supporting our troops by debating an early pullout. Many US officers in Iraq, especially at company and field grade levels, know that while they are winning every tactical battle, they are losing strategically. And according to the New York Times last week, they are beginning to voice complaints about Americans at home bearing none of the pains of the war. One can only guess about the enlisted ranks, but those on a second tour – probably the majority today – are probably anxious for an early pullout. It is also noteworthy that US generals in Iraq are not bubbling over with optimistic reports they way they were during the first few years of the war in Vietnam. Their careful statements and caution probably reflect serious doubts that they do not, and should not, express publicly. The more important question is whether or not the repressive and vindictive behavior by the secretary of defense and his deputy against the senior military — especially the Army leadership, which is the critical component in the war — has made it impossible for field commanders to make the political leaders see the facts.